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 Traders endogenously select an information source to maximized expected profits.  Those 
traders selecting to use fundamental information receive a noisy indicator of next period’s 
dividend and construct a portfolio to maximize expected utility.  The other option is to employ a 
technical trading rule.  Due to the noise in the fundamental signal, optimal behavior by the 
fundamental traders creates patterns in the price which can profitably be exploited by the technical 
trading rule.  The technical trading rule performs best when the price is dominated by the 
fundamental traders.  Endogenous swings in the popularity of the technical trading rule can create 
price bubbles which amplify the movement of the underlying intrinsic value. 
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Technical Analysis, Price Trends, and Bubbles 
 
 Academics in economics and finance typically discount evidence of the usefulness of 
technical trading rules.  The Efficient Markets Hypothesis provides the theoretical foundation with 
which technical trading rules are rejected.  Market efficiency implies that market prices reflect the 
most recently available information.  Thus, in an environment of efficient markets, past price 
patterns cannot be used to forecast future returns.  Technical trading rules, which provide the user 
with a signal of when to buy or sell an asset based on such price patterns, should not be useful for 
generating excess returns. 
 Despite academic admonitions, use of technical trading rules is widespread.  The finance 
section of any good bookstore offers a large selection of books purporting successful strategies 
based on trading rules.  The books contain examples, advice, and sometimes explanations of how 
and why each trading rule works.  Weekend and cable television programs feature chartists who 
make recommendations based on their readings of charts and technical trading rules.  Many firms 
employ chartists in house or subscribe to chartist services through newsletters.  Real-time charts 
and technical trading rules can even be monitored on the internet.  Taylor and Allen [1992] 
document the popularity of the trading rules in their survey of currency traders in London. 
 Technical traders (the users of technical trading rules) and chartists tend to put little faith in 
strict efficient markets.  In defense of a trend following rules, traders describe how prices are 
influenced by private information, but do not fully reflect it.  Prices may even be slow to react to 
public information.  Users claim that technical trading rules provide an indication of when those 
with the superior information have begun to trade and what position they are taking in the market.  
With a quick enough response, the technical trader is able to imitate the actions of those with the 2
superior information before the market price completes its adjustment.  The opportunity to make a 
profit is lost if the trader waits to receive the fundamental information, since he will not likely 
receive it until long after the price adjustment is complete, if at all.  The Rendleman, Jones, and 
Latané [1982] finding that price movement starts before the earnings report is made public and 
continues to adjust after the reports are made public, lending credence to the technical trader’s 
story. 
 For this paper, a model is developed and examined in which individual rational optimizing 
behavior leads to inefficiencies in an asset market which can be exploited through use of a 
technical trading rule. The objectives for this paper are to explore the profitability of select 
technical trading rules in the market and to determine the impact of the technical trading rules on 
the market.  The approach examines the aggregate behavior of heterogeneous agents.  In the 
model, each trader individually selects the information source believed to be the most beneficial 
for the next period of trading.  Much of the model is developed analytically, but the final analysis 
is accomplished through computer simulations. 
 A number of recent papers employ techniques relevant to this work. Brock and Hommes 
[1997] and Brock and LeBaron [1996] model endogenous information selection by individual 
traders.  Both papers analyze the market by considering heterogeneous traders and then 
aggregating within groups of traders.  The simulation developed and explored by Arthur et al 
[1997] simulate a small number of individual interacting agents.  Both styles of simulation have 
the traders relying on the past performance as a measure of its future success.  The endogenous 
selection of which information source to use is thus based on past performance.  Chiarella and He 
[1999] explore further the Brock and Hommes environment by examining the impact of different 
parameters and as well as various potential heterogeneities among traders.  Farmer [2000] and 3
Lux and Marchesi [1998] do not have shifting populations of traders, but instead base each 
trader’s current access to capital on past trading success, which leads to a similar results with 
regards to the market power of a trading strategy is concerned.  Brock and Hommes model a non-
durable commodities market, but for the remaining four asset market models, when the market is 
near equilibrium, profits are made by chance rather than by strategy, which allows the TTR to 
occasionally earn greater profits than the fundamental information.  The resulting shift in market 
power to the technical trading rules moves the market away from equilibrium and can actually 
generate patterns which contribute to additional technical trading rule success.  One of the 
primary objective for this paper is to have traders determine whether conditions call for the 
acquisition of fundamental information based on observations of the current state of the market 
rather than on past performance.  Another objective is to examine the technical trading rules as 
they are ideally used by traders. 
 Other papers related to this analysis include models examining the employment of technical 
trading rules.  Using the standard approach of Grossman and Stiglitz [1980], Grundy and 
McNichols [1989] and Brown and Jennings [1989] employ two rounds of trading in order to 
examine the information revealed in past prices.  Blume, Easley, and O’Hara [1994] work with a 
similar model, but introduce features to make trading volume a useful statistic.  These models, as 
do many models examining the use of technical trading rules, rely on stationarity of the unknown 
parameter.  With stationarity, a sequence of market generated data provides information on the 
unknown parameter.  The model presented in this paper lacks such stationarity.  If the trading rule 
is to be useful, it must provide information about future realizations of either the market generated 
price series or of the exogenous dividend series without the aid of convergence to a stable 
terminal value. 4
 
I.  The Model 
 The model is developed with the aim of creating an environment in which market 
participants reasonably choose to rely on a technical trading rule, at least under certain conditions. 
 
A.  The Market 
 A large but finite number of agents, indexed by i = 1, ..., N, trade a risky asset and a risk free 
bond.  Early in time period t, the trader selects which information source he intends to use for the 
period.  Based on the information signal received, the trader purchases ai,t units of the risky asset 
at price pt and bi,t units of the risk free bond.  The risk free bond, with a price of one, pays R.  In 
period t + 1, the risky asset pays a stochastic dividend dt+1 and traders sell the asset for the market 
determined price, pt+1.  The dividend follows a random walk: 
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 The available sources of information are a signal based on fundamental information about 
the risky asset or to use a technical trading rule (TTR) which provides the investor with a buy or 
sell indicator based on past and present price patterns. 
 
B.  The Fundamental Trader 
 Traders who choose to receive a signal based on fundamental information are modeled as 
selecting a portfolio to maximize an exponential utility function conditional on the given 
information set Hi,t, 5
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 Under the assumption that returns are distributed normally, the demand for the risky asset is 
the conditional expectation of the excess return to the risky asset divided by g times its conditional 
variance: 
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Were the market price determined solely by the fundamental traders,  1 1 + + + t t d p  would have a 
normal distribution.  The normality may no longer be true in a market populated by technical 
traders, but the demand function will remain the same.
1 
 A subset of Hi,t is the shared common information set It = {dt, pt-1, nt-1, ttrt-1} where nt is the 
proportion of the population using the TTR and ttrt indicates “buy” or “sell” according to the 
indication of the TTR.  Both nt and ttrt are developed more extensively below.  The private 
component of Hi,t is a signal that provides the recipient with an indication of next period’s 
dividend payment.  The individual’s private signal, yi,t, derives from the following formula: 
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 A motivating factor for the introduction and use of technical trading rules is the cost of 
obtaining quality fundamental information.  Traders wish to avoid relying on costly information at 
times when the expected benefits are limited.  A cost to acquiring the fundamental information is 
considered, but found to be unnecessary and provides no additional insight. 
                                                 
1 LeBaron [1999] suggests thinking of the demand function as maximizing a utility function which closely 
resembles the negative exponential, but one which very likely no longer exhibits CARA 6
 Recognizing that the private signal is a noisy indicator of the future dividend, the trader’s 
optimal forecast of dt+1 relies on a weighted combination of the received signal and the 
unconditional expectation. 
  E[dt+1| t i H , ] = (1 - b)dt + byi,t (4) 
with 








The combination minimizes the expected squared error of the forecast.  Aggregating among the 
fundamental traders, the mean forecast of dt+1 is  
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C.  The Technical Trader 
 One easily implemented and commonly computed technical trading rule is a Simple Moving 
Average trading rule.  Each period, the trader computes an average of the price of the risky asset 
over some extended period, l.  This is referred to as the moving average (MA) 
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The rule provides a “buy” or “sell” signal based on whether the current price is above or below 
the MA.  The time-series created, ttrt, has a value of 1 in the event that pt is greater than MAt 
(buy) or -1 in the event that pt is less than MAt (sell).  Placing bands around the moving average, 
so that users receive a “hold” signal when pt is between the bands, is known as the Envelope 
trading rule.  For the Envelope rule, assigning ttrt = 0 corresponds to a “hold” signal.  Both the 7
MA and Envelope rules are trend following signals, meaning that they tend to signal “buy” during 
a price rise and “sell” during a price decline. 
 The individual trader using the TTR needs a demand function based on the signal.  The 
volume of demand of each technical trader is set to a fixed value, vol
TR.  The trader using the 
trading rule has demand 
   t
TR TR
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D.  Determining the Market Price 
 Let 
F
t a  and 
TR a  represent the period t average demand by fundamental traders and 
technical traders using the TTR respectively; 
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in each period t.  In the Walrasian equilibrium, the price is determined to satisfy this condition.  In 
forming expectations of the period’s price, fundamental traders conjecture that the price is 
determined by a linear function of the information underlying the private signals.  The 
idiosyncratic component of the private signals are aggregated away, leaving: 
   1 2 1 , 0 + + + = t t t t d b d b b p . (7) 
In the posterior, this conjecture is correct. The second two terms of the price equations capture 
the influence of the fundamental traders who rely on observed dividends and their individual 8
private signals.  The coefficients solve to b1 = (1-b)/(R-1) and b2 = b/(R-1).  The value of the 
intercept, b0,t, reflects the impact of the demand by the group of technical traders, which is time 
dependent.  The solution to b0,t requires the discussion of expectations which follows.  The 
conditional variance solves to  
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 When analyzing the simulations, it will be useful to compare the market clearing price to the 
price that would have prevailed in the absence of the technical traders.  Label this price p
F where  
   1 2 1 + + = t t
F
t d b d b p  
 
E. The Role of Expectations: Selecting an Information Source 
 Prior to receiving one’s private signal, each trader must select a signal source.  The only 
information available at the time of this decision is the shared public information in It.  The trader 
attempts to maximize expected profits, defined as the quantity demanded of the risky asset times 
the realized excess return of the risky asset over the risk free bond.  The expected profit to using 
the fundamental information sources is thus 
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 The closed form solution to (8) and b0,t can be obtained by substituting in equations (7) and 
(4), the public information based expectations, and the solutions for b1 and b2.  Two possible 
solutions exist, each of which is demonstrated to be self fulfilling.  Under the “continuation” 9
regime, traders anticipate that the distortion in price caused by the technical trading rule persists 
into the next period.  Traders forecast b0,t+1 = b0,t-1.  The expected profit computes to 
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with b0,t = 




t t .  Expected profits for the fundamental information is greater than or equal 
to zero, strictly greater than zero when the TTR causes mis-pricing of the security.  The expected 
profit is increasing in the impact of the TTR, but is fairly small due to the prediction that the 
market price fails to revert to the fundamental price, thus removing the anticipation of a capital 
gain.  The expected profit reflects only the gain from the fact that the price does not properly 
reflect the expected value of dividend payment. 
 The “exploitations” regime is based on the traders assuming that any distortions caused by 
the technical trading rules quickly dissipates.  They forecast b0,t+1 = 0.  The result is that the 
expected profit becomes 
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.  The magnitude of the profit term is much larger than under the 
continuation regime because the traders anticipate a capital gain from the market’s return to p
F. 
 The expected profit from using the fundamental information source is compared to the 
performance evaluation of the technical trading rule.  Traders use a weighted average of the past 
performance of the trading rule to form an estimate of its success in the present period.  This is 10
not all that odd a stipulation since the advice of technical trading rule practitioners is to look for 
and consider using rules that have recently performed well.
2 
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where n indicates the weight placed on the most recent observations of profits.
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 As a way of introducing heterogeneity, the individual trader’s final choice is modeled as a 
randomized discrete choice in the nature of Manski and McFadden [1981] and Anderson, de 
Palma, and Thisse [1992].  Applying the LLN to the individual probabilities, the proportion of the 
population choosing each signal is equal to the probability that individual traders choose that 
signal.  Thus, 
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is the proportion of the population using the TTR in period t. 
 The greater the expected benefit of one signal over the other, the higher the proportion of 
traders who choose to use that signal.  How sensitive the population is to differences in the 
expected profits is set according the “intensity of choice” parameter, r.
4  The greater the value of 
r, the greater the sensitivity of traders to differences in expected profits of each signal.  With r ﬁ 
¥, small differences in the expected profits lead to large population shifts towards the source with 
the greater expected profit for the period.  In this case, the model choice approaches full 
rationality.  With r set to zero, differences in the expected profits are ignored.  The population of 
                                                 
2 For example, major software packages popular among traders for tracking charts and technical trading rules 
actively promote a feature which automatically informs the user which of the rules tracked in real-time have 
recently performed well. 
3 The t-2 profit is the most recently observed.  The t-1 profit has yet to be determined since the time t price is, as 
yet, undetermined. 
4 Setting r identifies the standard deviation of randomized component of the individual agent’s expectations of 
profit. 11
traders split evenly between the information options, regardless of which has the higher expected 
profit.
5 
 Once traders select their information source for the period, individual signals are received.  
Equation (3) indicates how the fundamental traders use their expectations of excess returns to 
determine a demand function.  Equation (5) indicates the shared demand of the technical traders.  
All traders submit their demand function to the market.  The market price for the risky asset, pt, is 
determined to clear the aggregate demand.  The period ends with traders carrying out their 
transactions, selling their holdings from the previous period and purchasing their portfolio to hold 
into the next period. 
 
II.  Simulation Results 
 Without a computable solution, computer simulation is necessary for examining the model 
and the impact of the TTR on the market’s behavior.  The objective is to determine which 
situations produce profitable outcomes for the TTR and for the fundamental information, what 
characterizes these situations, and how they arise.  The important control parameters are the 
intensity of choice parameter, r, and in selecting the regime.  The TTR employed in this 
examination is a five period moving average rule with no bands.  Examining different length MA 
and envelope rules all produce results similar to those presented in this paper.  The following 
parameters settings are kept unchanged:  , 3 . 0    , 02 . 1    , 1 = n = = g R  and  0001 . 0 =
TR vol ; 
also 1
2 = sd  and  1
2 = se which yields b = 1/2. 
                                                 
5 The “base” population proportions can be adjusted by employing weights in equation 11.  In general, decreasing 
the base n reduces the impact of the TTR on the market and increases the TTR’s profitability. 12
 The following sections examine the model, first by examining the impulse response 
generated by the simulated market to a shock in dividends, and then by examining the time-series 
generated from the random dividend process. 
 
A. Impulse Response 
 Set et = 1 and  t „ " = e t t     0  in order to examine the market impact of a one time shock.  
Figures 1a-1c and 2a-2c plot the impulse response of a number of important variables under the 
continuation and exploitations regimes respectively.  The shock occurs at t = 5.  The top frame 
plots two price series.  The solid line is the market clearing price, pt.  The dashed line is the value 
as perceived by the aggregate of the fundamental traders, pt
F.  The middle frame shows the 
average profits for the group of traders.  The solid line depicts 
F
t p  and the dashed line 
TR
t p .  The 
bottom frame plots the proportion of the population using the TTR, nt. 
  [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 Consider first the continuation regime and a low level of r.  Figure 1a is the extreme with r 
= 0.  The population is insensitive to expected profits and thus nt remains at 1/2.  In the period 
before the shock, 
F p 1 - t  reflects a portion of the perfect foresight adjustment because the 
fundamental trader’s forecast of dt combines dt-1 and dt.  The price increase at t-1 triggers a 
“buy” signal from the TTR.  The final market clearing price at t-1 is 
F p p 1 1 - t - t ‡ .  The inflated 
price is necessary to induce the fundamental traders to sell to the technical traders. 
 At time t, with dt revealed, 
F pt  completes the adjustment to the new equilibrium.  The same 
size population of technical traders continue to receive the same buy signal leading to the same 
price distortion in period t as in t-1.  This ensures a capital gain for the TTR in t-1.  Even in the 13
absence of the continued deviation, had pt = 
F pt , the TTR still earns a profit because, under the 
current setting, the inflated pt-1 remains below 
F pt .  The result is that the technical traders pay 
less than the realized value for the risky asset.  This result is sensitive to vol
TR  since increasing 
vol
TR increases the magnitude of the price deviation and could push pt-1 > 
F pt . 
 With a fixed population, and in the absence of additional shocks, the TTR continues to issue 
a buy signal for a time equal to the length of the MA.  When the TTR stops signaling “buy”, the 
subsequent price decline results in a switch to a “sell” signal, which is the beginning of a pattern of 
oscillation around stable p
F.  In this particular examination, the market dynamics are straight 
forward due to the fixed nt. 
 Set r to 300, as in Figure 1b, and the population responds to differences in the expected 
profit of each information sources.  The positive profits from the buy position taken in period t-1 
are realized in period t and first influences the population proportion at time t+1 by increasing 
) ( 1
TR
t E + t p .  Also in time t and t-1, the fundamental traders observe a distortion in the price, but, 
as discussed, under the continuation regime they do not anticipate a return to p
F.  So the 
magnitude of the expected profit is very small, particularly when compared to the recently realized 
profits of the TTR.  Thus, in t+1, nt increases as traders are attracted to the TTR.  The TTR 
continues to signal “buy”.  The additional technical traders force the market price to increase 
further resulting in 
F p p 1 1 + t + t -  > 
F p p t t - .  This market behavior constitutes a price bubble.  
Despite a leveling off of the fundamental value, the price continues to rise as the population of 
traders shifts towards the use of the TTR. 
 The larger the r setting, the greater the number of traders who shift towards using the TTR.  
If large enough, the resulting capital gain can produce enough profits for the TTR to attract a 14
further increase nt for period t+2, as in Figure 1c, where r = 1000.  The price bubble feeds off of 
the continued realized profits of the TTR.  The continued profits earned by the TTR depend on 
the capital gains resulting from the price bubble.  The relationship is symbiotic.  The bubble 
collapses when the population growth fails to produce the necessary profits to counter the losses 
from overpayment for the realized dividend.  How large and how quickly a bubble develops is 
based on r.  At extraordinarily large values of r, nt quickly approaches one after the shock to 
dividends.  Having reached the limit, the bubble also quickly collapses, but only because of the 
inability to attract more traders to continue the bubble’s growth.  The collapse back to 
fundamentals is neither anticipated, nor intentionally exploited by the fundamental traders. 
 During a bubble’s growth, the technical traders earn positive profits at the expense of the 
fundamental traders.  When the bubble collapses, the fundamental traders share the windfall. 
  [Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 Under the exploitation regime, the price deviation is substantially smaller than under the 
continuation regime.  Though subject to the same level of noise in the private signal, the 
fundament traders in the exploitation regime are much more willing to sell shares of the risky asset 
at a price just slightly greater than p
F than are traders under the continuation regime.  This stems 
from the anticipation of being able to profit from the market’s return to p
F.  At r = 0, except for 
the smaller deviation from the fundamental price, the market behaves essentially the same as under 
the continuation regime, as revealed by Figure 2a.  In Figure 2b with r = 300, a barely discernable 
bubble develops for period t+1.  The t-1 price is greater than the fundamental price, but remains 
substantially less than the realized pt.  The TTR population increases because the realized profit 
earned by the TTR proves more attractive to traders than is the anticipation of the capital gains 
expected from the minor adjustment back to the fundamental value. 15
 A large increase in r is required to alter the pattern of the market response to the shock.  In 
Figure 2c, with r = 2000, the population shifts towards the TTR after the initial profit realization.  
With the large price deviation that results, the fundamental information becomes attractive.  The 
shift back corrects the market price, reducing the need to use the fundamental information so that 
the population reverts to the TTR.  The population and price oscillate until the impact diminishes.  
Increasing r further simply increases the magnitude, but the oscillations remain diminishing. 
 Each of the two regimes is self fulfilling.  Under the continuation regime, the fundamental 
information is much less attractive to traders, even when a deviation from p
F is perceived.  
Further, traders who do collect the fundamental information trade under the assumption that 
prices will not return to the fundamental value, the resulting in no market pressure to move the 
market price towards p
F.  Under the exploitation regime, traders anticipate a benefit to knowing 
the fundamental value if they suspect a deviation from p
F.  In addition, those traders who obtain 
an indicator of next period’s dividend trade aggressively to exploit the anticipated capital gain 
from the return p
F.  Such aggressive trading tends to succeed in keeping the market price near p
F. 
 
B. Market Simulations 
 The market is examined by running simulations based on the random dividend process.  The 
simulations presented consists of 10,000 periods.  The two simulations displayed in Figures 3 and 
4 are representative of the continuation and exploitations regimes when subjected to the same set 
of random socks.  For these figures, a new frame is include that plots pt - 
F
t p .  The parameter r is 
set to 300  for both.  As suggested by the impulse response examinations, the price deviations are 
substantially larger in magnitude under the continuation regime than under the exploitation 
regime. 16
  [Insert Figure 3 about here] 
  [Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 A pattern that stands out is how the price bubbles develop during trends in p
F (which are the 
result of trends in dt).  In Figure 3, the bubbles tend to grow in magnitude as the trend continues, 
collapsing when the trend stops or reverses.  The trends contribute to the realized profits of the 
TTR.  The profits feed the popularity of the TTR  which feeds the growth in the price bubbles, 
particularly in the continuation regime.  The end result is that the market price amplifies any trend 
in the underlying intrinsic value.  This outcome suggests that the price is subject to fads or 
overreaction as discussed by Shiller [1981], Shiller [1990], and De Bondt and Thaler [1990], 
among others.  The following section further investigates the stability of the trend induced 
bubbles. 
 As with the impulse response the TTR earns a profit during the bubble’s growth at the 
expense of the fundamental traders.  At the bubble’s collapse, the fundamental traders share in the 
capital gains.  The profits can be seen in the third frame of both figures 3 and 4. 
  [Insert Figure 5 about here] 
 The horizontal axis of Figure 5 runs from zero to one and the vertical axis is the average 
profits earned by a hypothetical trader who switches from the fundamental to the TTR 
information only if the population proportion, nt, surpasses the indicated value.  Thus, the trader 
on the far left of the scale relies on the TTR exclusively since all observations of nt are greater 
than zero.  On the far right is the trader who relies exclusively on the fundamental information 
even as nt approaches one. 
 The average profit earnings suggested by both Figures 5a and 5b are consistent with the 
impulse response analysis.  The trader who relies exclusively on the TTR earns average positive 17
profits, exploiting the fact that the purchase price at the start of a bubble remains close to p
F and 
below the realized value after the bubble collapses.  The trader who relies on the fundamental 
information exclusively earns positive average profits for larger values of r, but negative profits 
for low values of r. 
 With only two groups of traders, one group’s profits in a given period are made at the 
expense of the other group.  When there is little or no shift in the population proportion, the 
positive average profits for the TTR, requires negative average profits for the fundamental 
information.  With a shifting population proportion, the timing of the gains and losses becomes 
important.  At the beginning of a price bubble, the proportion of the population using fundamental 
information is relatively high (keeping the price near p
F).  As the bubble grows, this proportion 
falls.  By the time the bubble collapses, the population using the fundamental information is 
relatively small.  Figure 6 plots the relationship between nt and the magnitude of the price bubble.  
The larger the price bubble the fewer users of the fundamental information.  Though the total 
market wide fundamental trader profits from the bubble’s collapse is less than the total loss during 
its rise, the losses are spread among many traders while the profits are concentrated among the 
thinned population that remains.  The individual fundamental traders profits during a price 
bubble’s collapse can be exceptionally large when 1-nt is particularly small. 
 The trader in the middle, who switches from fundamental information to the TTR after the 
TTR demonstrates success, suffers the greatest losses.  This trader tends to be a fundamental 
trader during the bubble’s development and then switches to the TTR for the bubbles collapse, 
earning negative profits throughout. 
 Under the continuation regime, if vol
TR is large enough that pt-1 > 
F pt , then even at a 
bubble’s inception, the technical traders tend to over pay for the security based on the realized 18
value.  Increasing vol
TR shifts the curves in 5a so that on the left, 
TR p  < 0, and on the right, 
F p  > 
0, even at low r for the continuation regime.  In the exploitation regime, the impact of the 
technical traders on price is so minimal that vol
TR would have to be set unreasonably large in order 
to make the TTR unprofitable. 
  [Insert Figure 6 about here] 
 
C. Repeated shocks 
 A reasonable interest is in how the trend induced price bubbles behave.  Do they only 
collapse when the trend stops or reverses, or would they collapse on their own if given enough 
time?  Is the stability of the bubbles different for the continuation and exploitation regimes?  In 
order to better understand the situation, a continuous series of shock is examined by setting 
  1 = e + t k for k ‡ 0, zero otherwise.  As with the impulse response analysis, t = 5. 
  [Insert Figure 7 about here] 
 Examining the continuation regime, Figure 7a displays the results of a relatively low r = 
100.  The top frame plots the market price deviation, 
F
t t p p - .  The middle and lower frames plot 
profits and nt.  The figure suggests that the nt increases to a stable n* and a fixed (pt - 
F
t p )*.  At 
this steady state, the buy signal of the TTR earns a positive profit, indicating pt+1 + dt+1 - Rpt > 0.  
Further, the profit earned by the TTR is sufficiently large to exceeds the expected profit of using 
the fundamental information. 
 Figure 7b captures how with the elevated r, the momentum of the TTR profits causes the 
population increase to surpass n*.  At the elevated level, the realized TTR profits are insufficient 
to support the population of technical traders, though the TTR profits remain positive.  The 19
proportion drops down to n*.  The stable n* appears to be an increasing function of r, which is 
consistent with the greater “intensity of choice” parameter.
6 
 Increase r to r = 800, as in Figure 7c, and the market experiences dampening oscillations 
around n*.  Increase r further and the oscillations become explosive, as demonstrated in 7d with 
r = 860.  When this occurs, the particularly small population of fundamental traders that remains 
by the time the bubble collapses realize enormous individual profits. 
  [Insert Figure 8 about here] 
 Under the exploitation regime, the smaller price deviation tends to keep the asset price 
below the realized value.  At r = 100, the observed time series are similar to the continuation 
regime.  Figure 8a demonstrates that, as with the continuation regime, nt and (pt - 
F
t p ) converge 
to stables values.  In the exploitation regime, stabilization of the market away from the p
F requires 
that the profit earned by the technical traders competes against expected profits from the 
exploitation of a price collapse.  In contrast to the continuation regime, this requires that the price 
deviation remains small which keeps the expected profit from a return to p
F sufficiently small.  In 
Figure 8b, increase r to 600.  As with 7b, the population increase to surpass n*, but rather than 
generating a dampening oscillation towards a stable n*, the oscillations explode until the 
population alternates just short of the extremes of  nt = 0 and nt = 1. 
 Even with nt near 1, the distortion to the price is too small to produce profits for the 
fundamental traders.  For the price oscillation to generate profits for the fundamental traders 
requires further increase in the intensity of choice, as in 8c where r = 1300. 
 
                                                 
6 That n* is an increasing function of r can be demonstrated using numerical analysis. 20
III.  Concluding Remarks and Further Study 
 Because fundamental information gathered through individual research provides the trader 
with a noisy signal of a security’s intrinsic value, the trader must temper his forecast by 
incorporating publicly available information.  As a result, market prices reflect only a portion of 
the news which generates the individual signals.  The price does not fully adjust to private 
information until it becomes public.  A trend following technical trading rule is a tool which can 
exploit this situation by signaling periods of transition. 
 The technical trading rule performs best when the market price is set by the fundamental 
traders.  Two situations keep the market price near the fundamental price.  Either, the popularity 
of the technical trading rule is limited through low intensity of choice so that the popularity of the 
technical trading rule cannot reach a level where it overly distorts the price, or the impact of the 
technical trading rule on price is held in check by the fundamental traders.  This latter condition, 
by keeping the market price near the fundamental value, creates the somewhat counterintuitive 
result that the technical trading rule performs best when the market works hard to exploit any 
perceived deviations from the fundamental price. 
 Whether or not it is beneficial to exploit price deviations is self fulfilling.  If traders 
overwhelmingly choose not to, then deviation from the fundamental value remain and the choice is 
correct.  If the traders overwhelmingly choose to aggressively trade on deviations, the market 
corrects and, again, the trader’s behavior is correct. 
 Price bubbles develop in situations where the technical traders influence the market price.  
As a price bubble grows, it increases the profit earned by the TTR, contributing to additional 
growth in the population using the TTR and further development of the price bubble; a symbiotic 
relationship.  The price bubbles also tend to magnify the movements of the asset’s intrinsic value. 21
 Preliminary examinations provide direction for continued research.  A price dividend rule in 
which the user “sells” in the event that the p/d ratio exceeds a threshold value is useless in the 
market dominated by fundamental traders.  Once the MA technical traders enter the market, their 
influence on the price makes such a rule profitable.  The impact of a population of traders using a 
price dividend rule on the market and on the profitability of the MA rule deserve further 
investigation.  The possibility that each rule in the market spawns a pattern that previously did not 
exist, and that can be profitably exploited by a new rule provides a good foundation for market 
analysis employing pattern recognition programs or genetic algorithms for technical trading rule 
creation and destruction. 
 22
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FFigure 2: Impule Response, exploitation regime
2c: r = 2000























2a: r = 0
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FFigure 3: Sample Time Series from Simulation, Continuation regime, r = 300






























FFigure 4: Sample Time Series from Simulation, Exploitation regime, r = 300



























FFigure 5: Average profits according to propensity to use Fundamental Information



















r=300Figure 6: Price deviation vs proportion of population using the TTR, Continuation and Exploitation regimes








EFigure 7: Repeated shocks, continuation regime
c: r = 800




















d: r = 860
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FFigure 8: Repeated shocks, exploitation regime
c: r = 1300
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